Schedule

• Networking

Chair: Emily Cichocki

• Social and Political Philosophy

• Meta-Ethics

Chair: Tyra Lennie

• Feminist Philosophy

Chair: Manuela Rondón Triana

• Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Chair: Chase Moloney

• Epistemology

Organizer: Pirachula Chulanon - Richard Neer (University of Chicago)- Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp)- Sonia Sedivy (University of Toronto)- Susanna Berger (University of Southern California)

• Symposium

Chair: Matthew Delhey

• Metaphysics

Available in networking space

• Networking

Chair: Suze G. Berkhout (University of Toronto)

• Social and Political Philosophy

Chair: Duncan Maclean

Chair: Paulina Siemieniec

• Feminist Philosophy

Chair: Evan Robichaud

• Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Chair: Ilgin Aksoy

• Contemporary European Philosophy

Chair: Adam Murray

• Epistemology

Final rounds

• Partner Programming

Chair: Tim McKee

• Applied Ethics

The CPA has partnered with the Chairs and Heads of Philosophy departments in Canada to plan and host a forum in which Chairs can review data and share strategies bearing on common issues, and the needs of their departments and programs. The common opportunities, challenges, and experiences of Philosophy programs mean that the insights of fellow Chairs within the discipline can be particularly valuable, often applying across institutions. At the same time, the Chairs’ Forum is an opportunity for Philosophy departments in Canada to coordinate strategies on issues of national or discipline-wide significance, including diversity, inclusivity, and climate; the significance of indigenization for Philosophy departments; and public outreach and perceptions of philosophy beyond the academy.

Please note that lunch is not provided as part of the conference. However, there is a convenient food court located in the basement of the St. James A building for your dining needs.

• Networking

Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal)co-authored with Mauro Rossi (UQÀM) We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it to value something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first-order or a second-order desire towards it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of all these mental states. In our paper, we raise some objections against all these accounts and defend a new affective account of valuings. Unlike standard affective accounts, according to which the term ‘valuing’ refers to a single type of affective state, such as care, we hold that ‘valuing’ refers to the members of a class of affective states, namely, the class of sentiments. On our view, to value something is to have a particular sentiment towards it. Since sentiments can be of different types, our account implies that there are as many ways of valuing things as there are types of sentiments. Chair: Mark McCullagh

• Plenary

Chair: Jules Sheldon

• Social and Political Philosophy

Chair: Kseniya Dybatch

• Moral Psychology

• Feminist Philosophy

Chair: Sage Cugino

• Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Chair: Andrew Allison

• Epistemology

Chair: Clair Baleshta

• Applied Ethics

• Metaphysics

Refreshments in the networking space

• Networking

Chair: Jules Sheldon

• Social and Political Philosophy

Chair: Kseniya Dybatch

• Moral Psychology

• Feminist Philosophy

Chair: Sage Cugino

• Philosophy of Art

Chair: Andrew Allison

• Epistemology

Chair: Clair Baleshta

• Applied Ethics

• Metaphysics

Health & Democracy in the 21st Century / Santé et démocratie au 21e siècle

• Plenary

• Networking